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Abstract. In the Possible Winner problem in computational social
choice theory, we are given a set of partial preferences and the question
is whether a distinguished candidate could be made winner by extending
the partial preferences to linear preferences. Previous work has provided,
for many common voting rules, fixed parameter tractable algorithms for
the Possible Winner problem, with number of candidates as the param-
eter. However, the corresponding kernelization question is still open and
in fact, has been mentioned as a key research challenge [Bredereck et al.,
2014a]. In this paper, we settle this open question for many common
voting rules.
We show that the Possible Winner problem for maximin, Copeland,
Bucklin, ranked pairs, and a class of scoring rules that include the Borda
voting rule do not admit a polynomial kernel with the number of candi-
dates as the parameter. We show however that the Coalitional Ma-
nipulation problem which is an important special case of the Possible
Winner problem does admit a polynomial kernel for maximin, Copeland,
ranked pairs, and a class of scoring rules that includes the Borda vot-
ing rule, when the number of manipulators is polynomial in the number
of candidates. A significant conclusion of our work is that the Possi-
ble Winner problem is harder than the Coalitional Manipulation
problem since the Coalitional Manipulation problem admits a poly-
nomial kernel whereas the Possible Winner problem does not admit a
polynomial kernel.
Keywords: Computational social choice, possible winner, voting, kernelization,
parameterized complexity
1. INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
In many real life situations including multiagent systems, agents often need
to aggregate their preferences and agree upon a common decision (candidate).
Voting is an immediate natural tool in these situations. Common and clas-
sical applications of voting rules in artificial intelligence include collabora-
tive filtering [Pennock et al., 2000], planning among multiple automated agents
[Ephrati and Rosenschein, 1991], etc.
Usually, in a voting setting, it is assumed that the votes are complete or-
ders over the candidates. However, due to many reasons, for example, lack
of knowledge of voters about some candidates, a voter may be indifferent be-
tween some pairs of candidates. Hence, it is both natural and important to
consider scenarios where votes are partial orders over the candidates. When
votes are only partial orders over the candidates, the winner cannot be de-
termined with certainty since it depends on how these partial orders are ex-
tended to linear orders. This leads to a natural computational problem called
the Possible Winner [Konczak and Lang, 2005] problem: given a set of par-
tial votes P and a distinguished candidate c, is there a way to extend the par-
tial votes to linear ones to make c win? The Possible Winner problem has
been studied extensively in the literature [Baumeister et al., 2011, Betzler et al.,
2010, Betzler and Dorn, 2009, Betzler et al., 2009b, Chevaleyre et al., 2010,
Faliszewski et al., 2014, Lang et al., 2012, 2007, Pini et al., 2007, Walsh, 2007,
Xia and Conitzer, 2008] following its definition in [Konczak and Lang, 2005].
The Possible Winner problem is known to be in NPC for many common vot-
ing rules, for example, scoring rules, maximin, Copeland, Bucklin, and ranked
pairs etc. [Xia and Conitzer, 2008]. Walsh [Walsh, 2007] showed, for a constant
number of candidates, that the Possible Winner problem can be solved in
polynomial time for all the voting rules mentioned above. An important special
case of the Possible Winner problem is the Coalitional Manipulation
problem [Bartholdi et al., 1989] where only two kinds of partial votes are al-
lowed - complete preference and empty preference. The set of empty votes is
called the manipulators’ vote and is denoted by M . The Coalitional Manip-
ulation problem is in NPC for maximin, Copeland, and ranked pairs voting rules
even when |M | ≥ 2 [Faliszewski et al., 2008, 2010, Xia et al., 2009]. The Coali-
tional Manipulation problem is in P for the Bucklin voting rule [Xia et al.,
2009]. We refer to [Walsh, 2007, Xia and Conitzer, 2008, Xia et al., 2009] for
detailed overviews.
1.1 Our Methodology
Preprocessing, as a strategy for coping with hard problems, is universally ap-
plied in practice. The main goal here is instance compression - the objective is to
output a smaller instance while maintaining equivalence. In the classical setting,
NP-hard problems are unlikely to have efficient compression algorithms (since
repeated application would lead to an efficient solution for the entire problem,
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which is unexpected). However, the breakthrough notion of kernelization in pa-
rameterized complexity provides a mathematical framework for analyzing the
quality of preprocessing strategies. In parameterized complexity, each problem
instance (x, k) comes with a parameter k. The parameterized problem is said to
admit a kernel if there is a polynomial time algorithm (where the degree of poly-
nomial is independent of k), called a kernelization algorithm, that reduces the in-
put instance to an instance with size bounded by a function of k, while preserving
the answer. This has turned out to be an important and widely applied notion in
theory, and has also proven very successful in practice [Lokshtanov et al., 2012,
Weihe, 1998]. Quantitatively, running a kernelization algorithm before solving
it using an algorithm that runs in time f(|x|) brings down the running time to
f(k) + p(|x|), where |x| is the size of the input instance and the running time of
the kernelization algorithm is p(|x|).
A problem with parameter k is called fixed parameter tractable (FPT) if it
is solvable in time f(k) · p(|x|), where f is an arbitrary function of k and p is
a polynomial in the input size |x|. The existence of a fixed parameter tractable
algorithm implies existence of a kernel for that problem. However, the size of the
kernel need not be polynomial in the parameter. A polynomial kernel is said to
exist if there is a kernelization algorithm that can output an equivalent problem
instance of size polynomial in the parameter. We refer to [Downey and Fellows,
1999, Niedermeier, 2002] for an excellent overview on fixed parameter algorithms
and kernelization.
1.2 Contributions
Discovering kernelization algorithms is currently an active and interesting area
of research in computational social choice theory [Betzler, 2010, Betzler et al.,
2012, 2010, 2009a, Bredereck et al., 2014b, 2012, Dorn and Schlotter, 2012,
Froese et al., 2013]. Betzler et al. [Betzler et al., 2009b] showed that the Pos-
sible Winner problem has a kernelization algorithm when parameterized by
the total number of candidates for scoring rules, maximin, Copeland, Bucklin,
and ranked pairs voting rules. A natural and practical follow-up question is
whether the problem admits a polynomial kernel when parameterized by the
number of candidates. This question has been open ever since the work of Bet-
zler et al. and in fact, has been mentioned as a key research challenge in pa-
rameterized algorithms for computational social choice theory [Bredereck et al.,
2014a]. Betzler et al. showed non-existence of polynomial kernel for the Pos-
sible Winner problem for the k-approval voting rule when parameterized by
(t, k), where t is the number of partial votes [Betzler, 2010]. The NPC reduc-
tions for the Possible Winner problem for scoring rules, maximin, Copeland,
Bucklin, and ranked pairs voting rules given by Xia et al. [Xia et al., 2009] are
from the Exact 3 Set-Cover problem. Their results do not throw any light
on the existence of a polynomial kernel since Exact 3 Set-Cover has a trivial
O(m3) kernel where m is the size of the universe. In our work in this paper,
we show that there is no polynomial kernel for the Possible Winner prob-
lem for maximin, Copeland, Bucklin, ranked pairs, and a class of scoring rules
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that include the Borda voting rule, when parameterized by the total number
of candidates unless CoNP ⊆ NP/Poly. These hardness results are shown by a
parameter-preserving many-to-one reduction from the Small Universe Set
Cover problem for which there does not exist any polynomial kernel parame-
terized by universe size unless CoNP ⊆ NP/Poly [Dom et al., 2009].
On the other hand, we show that the Coalitional Manipulation problem
admits a polynomial kernel for maximin, Copeland, ranked pairs, and a class of
scoring rules that includes the Borda voting rule when we have O(poly(m)) num-
ber of manipulators – specifically, we exhibit an O(m2|M |) kernel for maximin
and Copeland, and an O(m4|M |) kernel for the ranked pairs voting rule, where
m is the number of candidates and M is the set of manipulators. The Coali-
tional Manipulation problem for the Bucklin voting rule is in P [Xia et al.,
2009] and thus the kernelization question does not arise.
A significant conclusion of our work is that, although the Possible Winner
and Coalitional Manipulation problems are both NPC, the Possible Win-
ner problem is harder than the Coalitional Manipulation problem since the
Coalitional Manipulation problem admits a polynomial kernel whereas the
Possible Winner problem does not admit a polynomial kernel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first establish the setup
and general notions. Next, we discuss non-existence of polynomial kernels for
the Possible Winner problem followed by existence of polynomial kernels for
the Coalitional Manipulation problem.
This paper is a significant extension of the conference version of this
work Dey et al. [2015]: this extended version includes all the proofs.
2 Preliminaries
Let V = {v1, . . . , vn} be the set of all voters and C = {c1, . . . , cm} the set of
all candidates. From, here on, n is the number of voters and m is the number
of candidates unless mentioned otherwise. Each voter vi’s vote is a preference
≻i over the candidates which is a linear order over C. For example, for two
candidates a and b, a ≻i b means that the voter vi prefers a to b. We will use
a >i b to denote the fact that a ≻i b, a 6= b. We denote the set of all linear
orders over C by L(C). The set of all preference profiles (≻1, . . . ,≻n) of the
n voters is denoted by L(C)n. We use x%y to denote the modulus operation
x mod y (for example, 5%2 is the same as 1). We denote the set {1, 2, . . .} by
N
+ and the set {1, · · · , k} by [k]. Let ⊎ denote the disjoint union of sets. A
map r : ⊎n,|C|∈N+L(C)
n −→ 2C \ {∅} is called a voting rule. For a voting rule r
and a preference profile ≻, we say a candidate x wins uniquely if r(≻) = {x}.
In this paper, unless mentioned otherwise, winning means winning uniquely.
A more general setting is an election where the votes are only partial orders
over candidates. A partial order is a relation that is reflexive, antisymmetric,
and transitive. A partial vote can be extended to possibly more than one linear
votes depending on how we fix the order for the unspecified pairs of candidates.
For example, in an election with the set of candidates C = {a, b, c}, a valid
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partial vote can be a ≻ b. This partial vote can be extended to three linear
votes namely, a ≻ b ≻ c, a ≻ c ≻ b, c ≻ a ≻ b. However, the voting rules
always take as input a set of votes that are complete orders over the candidates.
Given an election E, we can construct a weighted graph GE called weighted
majority graph from E. The set of vertices in GE is the set of candidates in E.
For any two candidates x and y, the weight on the edge (x, y) is DE(x, y) =
NE(x, y) − NE(y, x), where NE(x, y)(NE(y, x)) is the number of voters who
prefer x to y (y to x). The following voting rules use weighted majority graph
to select winner. Some examples of common voting rules are as follows.
– Positional scoring rules: Given an m-dimensional vector α =
(α1, α2, . . . , αm) ∈ Rm with α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm, we can naturally de-
fine a voting rule - a candidate gets score αi from a vote if it is placed at the
ith position, and the score of a candidate is the sum of the scores it receives
from all the votes. The winners are the candidates with maximum score.
Scoring rules remain unchanged if we multiply every αi by any constant
λ > 0 and/or add any constant µ. Hence, we assume without loss of gener-
ality that for any score vector α, there exists a j such that αj − αj+1 = 1
and αk = 0 for all k > j. We call such an α a normalized score vector.
A scoring rule is called a strict scoring rule if α1 > α2 > · · · > αm. For
α = (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 1, 0), we get the Borda voting rule. With αi = 1
∀i ≤ k and 0 else, the voting rule we get is known as k-approval. Plurality is
1-approval and veto is (m− 1)-approval.
– Bucklin: A candidate x’s Bucklin score is the minimum number l such that
more than half of the voters rank x in their top l positions. The winners are
the candidates with lowest Bucklin score.
– Maximin: The maximin score of a candidate x is miny 6=xD(x, y). The win-
ners are the candidates with maximum maximin score.
– Copeland: The Copeland score of a candidate x is the number of candidates
y 6= x such that D(x, y) > 0. The winners are the candidates with maximum
Copeland score.
– Ranked pairs: We pick the pair (ci, cj) ∈ C × C such that D(ci, cj) is
maximum. We fix the ordering between ci and cj to be ci ≻ cj unless it
contradicts previously fixed orders.We continue this process until all pairwise
elections are considered. At this point, we have a complete order over the
candidates. Now, the top candidate is chosen as the winner.
We use the parallel-universes tie breaking [Brill and Fischer, 2012,
Conitzer et al., 2009] to define the winning candidate for the ranked pairs voting
rule. In this setting, a candidate c is a winner if and only if there exists a way to
break ties in all of the steps such that c is the winner. We say that a candidate
is the unique winner of a ranked pairs election if the candidate is the sole winner
in all possible tie breakings in all the steps.
We now briefly describe the framework in which we analyze the computa-
tional complexity of the Possible Winner problem.
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Parameterized Complexity. A parameterized problem Π is a subset of Γ ∗ ×
N, where Γ is a finite alphabet. An instance of a parameterized problem is a
tuple (x, k), where k is the parameter. A kernelization algorithm is a set of
preprocessing rules that runs in polynomial time and reduces the instance size
with a guarantee on the output instance size. This notion is formalized below.
Definition 1. [Kernelization] [Flum and Grohe, 2006, Niedermeier, 2002] A
kernelization algorithm for a parameterized problem Π ⊆ Γ ∗×N is an algorithm
that, given (x, k) ∈ Γ ∗×N, outputs, in time polynomial in |x|+k, a pair (x′, k′) ∈
Γ ∗×N such that (a) (x, k) ∈ Π if and only if (x′, k′) ∈ Π and (b) |x′|, k′ ≤ g(k),
where g is some computable function. The output instance x′ is called the kernel,
and the function g is referred to as the size of the kernel. If g(k) = kO(1) then
we say that Π admits a polynomial kernel.
For many parameterized problems, it is well established that the existence
of a polynomial kernel would imply the collapse of the polynomial hierarchy to
the third level (or more precisely, CoNP ⊆ NP/Poly). Therefore, it is considered
unlikely that these problems would admit polynomial-sized kernels. For showing
kernel lower bounds, we simply establish reductions from these problems.
Definition 2. [Polynomial Parameter Transformation]
[Bodlaender et al., 2009] Let Γ1 and Γ2 be parameterized problems. We say that
Γ1 is polynomial time and parameter reducible to Γ2, written Γ1 ≤Ptp Γ2, if
there exists a polynomial time computable function f : Σ∗×N→ Σ∗×N, and a
polynomial p : N→ N, and for all x ∈ Σ∗ and k ∈ N, if f ((x, k)) = (x′, k′), then
(x, k) ∈ Γ1 if and only if (x′, k′) ∈ Γ2, and k′ ≤ p (k). We call f a polynomial
parameter transformation (or a PPT) from Γ1 to Γ2.
This notion of a reduction is useful in showing kernel lower bounds because
of the following theorem.
Theorem 1. [Bodlaender et al., 2009, Theorem 3] Let P and Q be parameter-
ized problems whose derived classical problems are P c, Qc, respectively. Let P c
be NPC, and Qc ∈ NP. Suppose there exists a PPT from P to Q. Then, if Q has
a polynomial kernel, then P also has a polynomial kernel.
3 Hardness of Kernelization for Possible Winner Problem
In this section, we show non-existence of polynomial kernels for the Possible
Winner problem for maximin, Copeland, Bucklin, ranked Pairs, and a class of
scoring rules that includes the Borda voting rule. We do this by demonstrating
polynomial parameter transformations from the Small Universe Set Cover
problem, which is the classic Set Cover problem, but now parameterized by
the size of the universe and the budget.
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Small Universe Set Cover Parameter: m+ k
Input: A set U = {u1, . . . , um} and a family F = {S1, . . . , St}.
Question: Is there a subfamily H ⊆ F of size at most k such that every element
of the universe belongs to at least one H ∈ H?
It is well-known [Dom et al., 2009] that Red-Blue Dominating Set pa-
rameterized by k and the number of non-terminals does not admit a polynomial
kernel unless CoNP ⊆ NP/Poly. It follows, by the duality between dominating set
and set cover, that Set Cover when parameterized by the solution size and the
size of the universe (in other words, the Small Universe Set Cover problem
defined above) does not admit a polynomial kernel unless CoNP ⊆ NP/Poly.
We now consider the Possible Winner problem parameterized by the num-
ber of candidates for maximin, Copeland, Bucklin, ranked pairs, and a class of
scoring rules that includes the Borda rule, and establish that they do not admit
a polynomial kernel unless CoNP ⊆ NP/Poly, by polynomial parameter transfor-
mations from Small Universe Set Cover.
3.1 Scoring Rules
First, we prove hardness of kernelization for the Possible Winner problem for
a large class of scoring rules that includes the Borda rule. For that, we use the
following lemma which has been used before [Baumeister et al., 2011].
Lemma 1. Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} ⊎D, (|D| > 0) be a set of candidates, and α a
normalized score vector of length |C|. Then, for any given X = (X1, . . . , Xm) ∈
Z
m, there exists λ ∈ R and a voting profile such that the α-score of ci is λ+Xi
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and the score of candidates d ∈ D is less than λ. Moreover,
the number of votes is O(poly(|C| ·
∑m
i=1 |Xi|)).
With the above lemma at hand, we now show hardness of polynomial kernel
result for the class of strict scoring rules.
Theorem 2. The Possible Winner problem for any strict scoring rule, when
parameterized by the number of candidates, does not admit a polynomial kernel
unless CoNP ⊆ NP/Poly.
Proof. Let (U ,F , k) be an instance of Small Universe Set Cover, where
U = {u1, . . . , um} and F = {S1, . . . , St}. We use Ti to denote U \ Si. We let
(α1, α2, . . . , αt) denote the score vector of length t, and let δi denote the difference
(αi−αi+1). Note that for a strict scoring rule, all the δi’s will be strictly positive.
We now construct an instance (C, V, c) of Possible Winner as follows.
Candidates. C = U ⊎ V ⊎ {w, c, d}, where V := {v1, ..., vm}.
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Partial Votes, P . The first part of the voting profile comprises t partial votes,
and will be denoted by P1. Let Vj denote the set {v1, . . . , vj}. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ t,
we first consider a profile built on a total order ηi:
ηi := d ≻ Si ≻ Vj ≻ w ≻ · · · ,where j = m− |Si|.
Now, we obtain a partial order λi based on ηi as follows:
λi := ηi \ ({w} × ({d} ⊎ Si ⊎ Vj))
Let P ′1 be the set of votes {ηi | 1 ≤ i ≤ t}. We will now add more votes, which
we denote by P2, such that s(c) = s(ui), s(d) − s(c) = (k − 1)δ1, s(c) − s(w) =
k(δ2 + δ3 + · · · + δm+1) + δ1, s(c) > s(vi) + 1, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t where s(·) is
the scores of the candidates from the combined voting profile P ′1 ⊎P2. From the
proof of Lemma 1, we can see that such votes can always be constructed. In
particular, also note that the voting profile P2 consists of complete votes. Note
that the number of candidates is 2m+ 3, which is polynomial in the size of the
universe, as desired. We now claim that the candidate c is a possible winner for
the voting profile P1 ⊎ P2 with respect to the strict scoring rule if, and only if,
(U ,F) is a YES-instance of Set Cover.
In the forward direction, suppose, without loss of generality, that S1, . . . , Sk
form a set cover. Then we propose the following extension for the partial votes
λ1, . . . , λk:
w > d > Si > Vj > ...,
and the following extension for the partial votes λk+1, . . . , λt:
d > Si > Vj > w > ...
For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the position of d in the extension of λi proposed above is δ1
lower than its original position in ηi. Therefore, the final score of d is lower than
the score of c. Similarly, the scores of all the ui’s decrease by at least min
m
i=2{δi},
which is strictly positive, since the Si’s together form a set cover, and the scoring
rule is strict. Finally, the score of w increase by at most k(δ2 + δ3 + · · ·+ δm+1),
since there are at most k votes where the position of w in the extension of λi
improved from it’s original position in ηi. Therefore, the score of c is greater
than any other candidate, implying that c is a possible winner.
For the reverse direction, notice that there must be at least k extensions
where d is in the second position, since the score of d is (k − 1)δ1 more than
the score of c. In these extensions, observe that w will be at the first position.
On the other hand, placing w in the first position causes its score to increase
by (δ2 + δ3 + · · · + δm+1), therefore, if w is in first position in ℓ extensions, its
score increases by ℓ(δ2 + δ3 + · · · + δm+1). Since the score difference between
w and c is only k(δ2 + δ3 + · · · + δm+1) + 1, we can afford to have w in the
first position in at most k votes. Therefore, apart from the extensions where d
is in the second position, in all remaining extensions, w appears after Vj , and
therefore the candidates from Si continue to be in their original positions. We
now claim that the sets corresponding to the k votes where d is on top form
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a set cover. Indeed, if not, suppose the element ui is not covered. It is easily
checked that the score of such a ui remains unchanged in this extension, and
therefore its score is equal to c, contradicting our assumption that we started
with an extension for which c was a winner. ⊓⊔
The proof of Theorem 2 can be generalized to to a wider class of scoring rules
as stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let r be a positional scoring rule such that there exists a polyno-
mial function f : N → N, such that for every m ∈ N, there exists an index l in
the f(m) length score vector α satisfying following,
αi − αi+1 > 0, ∀l ≤ i ≤ l +m
Then, the Possible Winner problem for r, when parameterized by the number
of candidates, does not admit a polynomial kernel unless CoNP ⊆ NP/Poly.
3.2 Maximin Voting Rule
We will need the following lemma in subsequent proofs. The lemma has been
used before [McGarvey, 1953, Xia and Conitzer, 2008].
Lemma 2. For any function f : C × C −→ Z, such that
1. ∀a, b ∈ C, f(a, b) = −f(b, a).
2. either ∀a, b ∈ C, f(a, b) is even or ∀a, b ∈ C, f(a, b) is odd.
there exists a n voters’ profile such that for all a, b ∈ C, a defeats b with a margin
of f(a, b). Moreover,
n = O

 ∑
{a,b}∈C×C
|f(a, b)|


We now describe the reduction for the Possible Winner parameterized by
the number of candidates, for the maximin voting rule.
Theorem 3. The Possible Winner problem for maximin voting rule, when
parameterized by the number of candidates, does not admit a polynomial kernel
unless CoNP ⊆ NP/Poly.
Proof. Let (U ,F , k) be an instance of Small Universe Set Cover, where
U = {u1, . . . , um} and F = {S1, . . . , St}. We use Ti to denote U \ Si. We now
construct an instance (C, V, c) of the Possible Winner as follows.
Candidates. C := U ⊎W ⊎{c, d, x}⊎L. WhereW := {w1, w2, . . . , wm, wx}, L :=
{l1, l2, l3}.
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Partial Votes, P . The first part of the voting profile comprises t partial votes,
and will be denoted by P . For each 1 ≤ i ≤ t, we first consider a profile built
on a total order ηi. We denote the order w1 ≻ · · · ≻ wm ≻ wx by W . From
this point onwards, whenever we place a set of candidates in some position of a
partial order, we mean that the candidates in the set can be ordered arbitrarily.
For example, the candidates in Si can be ordered arbitrarily among themselves
in the total order ηi below.
ηi := L ≻W ≻ x ≻ Si ≻ d ≻ c ≻ Ti
Now, we obtain a partial order λi based on ηi as follows:
λi := ηi \ (W × ({c, d, x} ⊎ U))
The profile P consists of {λi | 1 ≤ i ≤ t}.
Complete Votes, Q. We now describe the remaining votes in the profile, which
are linear orders designed to achieve specific pairwise difference scores among
the candidates. This profile, denoted by Q, is defined according to Lemma 2
to contain votes such that the pairwise score differences of P ∪ Q satisfy the
following.
– D(c, w1) = −2k.
– D(c, l1) = −t.
– D(d, w1) = −2k − 2.
– D(x,wx) = −2k − 2.
– D(wi, ui) = −2t ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
– D(ai, l1) = D(wx, l1) = −4t.
– D(l1, l2) = D(l2, l3) = D(l3, l1) = −4t.
– D(l, r) ≤ 1 for all other pairs (l, r) ∈ C × C.
We note that the for all c, c′ ∈ C, the difference |D(c, c′) − DP (c, c′)| is always
even, as long as t is even and the number of sets in F that contain an element
u ∈ U is always even. Note that the latter can always be ensured without loss of
generality: indeed, if u ∈ U occurs in an odd number of sets, then we can always
add the set {u} if it is missing and remove it if it is present, flipping the parity in
the process. In case {u} is the only set containing the element u, then we remove
the set from both F and U and decrease k by one. The number of sets t can
be assumed to be even by adding a dummy element and a dummy pair of sets
that contains the said element. It is easy to see that these modifications always
preserve the instance. Thus, the constructed instance of Possible Winner is
(C, V, c), where V := P ∪Q. We now turn to the proof of correctness.
In the forward direction, let H ⊆ F be a set cover of size at most k. Without
loss of generality, let |H| = k (since a smaller set cover can always be extended
artificially) and let H = {S1, . . . , Sk} (by renaming).
If i ≤ k, let:
λ∗i := L ≻ x ≻ Si ≻ d ≻ c ≻W ≻ Ti
10
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If i > k, let:
λ∗i := L ≻W ≻ x ≻ Si ≻ d ≻ c ≻ Ti
Clearly λ∗i extends λi for all i ∈ 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let V
∗ denote the extended profile
consisting of the votes {λ∗i | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪Q. We now claim that c is the unique
winner with respect to maximin voting rule in V ∗.
Since there are k votes in V ∗ where c is preferred over w1 and (t − k) votes
where w1 is preferred to c, we have:
DV ∗(c, w1) = DV (c, w1) + k − (t− k)
= −2k + k − (t− k) = −t
It is easy to check that maximin score of c is −t. Also, it is straightforward to
verify the following table.
Candidate maximin score
wi,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} < −t
ui,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} ≤ −4t
wx ≤ −4t
l1, l2, l3 ≤ −4t
x ≤ −t− 2
d ≤ −t− 2
Therefore, c is the unique winner for the profile V ∗.
We now turn to the reverse direction. Let P ∗ be an extension of P such that
V ∗ := P ∗ ∪Q admits c as a unique winner with respect to maximin voting rule.
We first argue that P ∗ must admit a certain structure, which will lead us to an
almost self-evident set cover for U .
Let us denote by P ∗C the set of votes in P
∗ which are consistent with c ≻ w1,
and let P ∗W be the set of votes in P
∗ which are consistent with w1 ≻ c. We first
argue that P ∗C has at most k votes.
Claim. Let P ∗C be as defined above. Then, |P
∗
C | ≤ k.
Proof. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that more than k extensions are
consistent with c ≻ w1. Then we have:
DV ∗(c, w1) ≥ DV (c, w1) + k + 1− (t− k − 1)
= −2k + 2k − t+ 2 = −t+ 2
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Since DV ∗(c, l1) = −t, the maximin score of c is −t. On the other hand, we also
have that the maximin score of d is given by DV ∗(d, w1), which is now at least
(−t):
DV ∗(d, w1) ≥ DV (d, w1) + k + 1− (t− k − 1)
= −2k − 2 + 2k − t+ 2 = −t
Therefore, c is no longer the unique winner in V ∗ with respect to the maximin
voting rule, which is the desired contradiction.
Next, we propose that a vote that is consistent with w1 ≻ cmust be consistent
with wx ≻ x.
Claim. Let P ∗W be as defined above. Then, any vote in P
∗
W must respect wx ≻ x.
Proof. Suppose there are r votes in P ∗C , and suppose that in at least one vote in
P ∗W where x ≻ wx. Notice that any vote in P
∗
C is consistent with x ≻ wx. Now
we have:
DV ∗(c, w1) = DV (c, w1) + r − (t− r)
= −2k + 2r − t
= −t− 2(k − r)
And further:
DV ∗(x,wx) ≥ DV (x,wx) + (r + 1)− (t− r − 1)
= −2k − 2 + 2r − t+ 2
= −t− 2(k − r)
It is easy to check that the maximin score of c in V ∗ is at most −t − 2(k − r),
witnessed by DV ∗(c, w1), and the maximin score of x is at least −t − 2(k − r),
witnessed by DV ∗(x,wx). Therefore, c is no longer the unique winner in V
∗ with
respect to the maximin voting rule, and we have a contradiction.
We are now ready to describe a set cover of size at most k for U based on
V ∗. Define J ⊆ [t] as being the set of all indices i for which the extension of λi
in V ∗ belongs to P ∗C . Consider:
H := {Si | i ∈ J}.
The set H is our proposed set cover. Clearly, |H| ≤ k. It remains to be shown
that H is a set cover.
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there is an element ui ∈ U that is
not covered byH. This means that for all i ∈ J , ui ∈ Ti, and in the corresponding
extensions of λi in V
∗, implying that wi ≻ ui. Further, for all i /∈ J , we have
that the extension of λi in V
∗ is consistent with:
w1 ≻ · · · ≻ wi ≻ · · · ≻ wx ≻ x ≻ Si ≻ c ≻ Ti,
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implying again that wi ≻ ui in these votes. Therefore, we have:
DV ∗(wi, ui) = DV (wi, ui) + k + (t− k) = −2t+ t = −t.
We know that the maximin score of c is less than or equal to −t, since
DV ∗(c, l1) = −t, and we now have that the maximin score of wi is −t. This
overrules c as the unique winner in V ∗, contradicting our assumption to that
effect. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
3.3 Copeland Voting Rule
We now describe the reduction for Possible Winner parameterized by the
number of candidates, for the Copeland voting rule.
Theorem 4. The Possible Winner problem for the Copeland voting rule,
when parameterized by the number of candidates, does not admit a polynomial
kernel unless CoNP ⊆ NP/Poly.
Proof. Let (U ,F , k) be an instance of Small Universe Set Cover, where
U = {u1, . . . , um}, and F = {S1, . . . , St}. For the purpose of this proof, we
assume (without loss of generality) that m ≥ 6. We now construct an instance
(C, V, c) of Possible Winner as follows.
Candidates. C := U ⊎ {z, c, d, w}.
Partial Votes, P . The first part of the voting profile comprises of m partial
votes, and will be denoted by P . For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we first consider a profile
built on a total order:
ηi := U \ Si ≻ z ≻ c ≻ d ≻ Si ≻ w
Now, we obtain a partial order λi based on ηi as follows:
λi := ηi \ ({z, c} × (Si ⊎ {d, w}))
The profile P consists of {λi | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}.
Complete Votes, Q. We now describe the remaining votes in the profile, which
are linear orders designed to achieve specific pairwise difference scores among
the candidates. This profile, denoted by Q, is defined according to lemma 2
to contain votes such that the pairwise score differences of P ∪ Q satisfy the
following.
– D(c, d) = t− 2k + 1
– D(z, w) = t− 2k − 1
– D(c, ui) = t− 1
– D(c, z) = t+ 1
– D(c, w) = −t− 1
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– D(ui, d) = D(z, ui) = t+ 1, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m
– D(z, d) = t+ 1
– D(ui, uj) = t+ 1, for all j ∈ [i+ 1, i+ ⌊m/2⌋], where addition is modulo m.
We note that the for all c, c′ ∈ C, the difference |D(c, c′)−DP (c, c′)| is always
even, as long t is odd and the number of sets in F that contain an element
a ∈ U is always odd. Note that the latter can always be ensured without loss
of generality: indeed, if a ∈ U occurs in an even number of sets, then we can
always add the set {a} if it is missing and remove it if it is present, flipping the
parity in the process. The number of sets t can be assumed to be odd by adding
a dummy element and a dummy set that contains the said element. It is easy to
see that these modifications always preserve the instance.
Thus the constructed instance of Possible Winner is (C, V, c), where V :=
P ∪Q. We now turn to the proof of correctness.
In the forward direction, let H ⊆ F be a set cover of size at most k. Without
loss of generality, let |H| = k (since a smaller set cover can always be extended
artificially) and let H = {S1, . . . , Sk} (by renaming).
If i ≤ k, let:
λ∗i := U \ Si ≻ z ≻ c ≻ d ≻ Si ≻ w
If i > k, let:
λ∗i := U \ Si ≻ d ≻ Si ≻ w ≻ z ≻ c
Clearly λ∗i extends λi for all i ∈ 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let V
∗ denote the extended profile
consisting of the votes {λ∗i | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪Q. We now claim that c is the unique
winner with respect to the Copeland voting rule in V ∗.
First, consider the candidate z. Between z and ui, even if z loses to ui in
every λ∗i , because D(z, ui) = t + 1, z wins the pairwise election between z and
ui. The same argument holds between z and d. Therefore, the Copeland score
of z, no matter how the partial votes were extended, is at least (m+ 1).
Further, note that all other candidates (apart from c) have a Copeland score
of less than (m + 1), because they are guaranteed to lose to at least three can-
didates (assuming m ≥ 6). In particular, observe that ui loses to at least ⌊m/2⌋
candidates, and d loses to all ui (merely by its position in the extended votes),
and w loses to all ui (because of way the scores were designed). Therefore, the
Copeland score of all candidates in C \ {z, c} is strictly less than the Copeland
score of z, and therefore they cannot be possible (co-)winners.
Now we restrict our attention to the contest between z and c. First note that
c beats every ui: since the sets of H form a set cover, every ui is present in some
λ∗i for i ≤ k, in a position after c. Since the difference score between c and ui was
(t − 1), even if c suffered defeat in every other extension, we have the pairwise
score of c and ui being at least t − 1 − (t − 1) + 1 = 1, which implies that c
defeats every ui in their pairwise election. Note that c also defeats d by getting
ahead of d in k votes, making its final score t−2k+1+k− (t−k) = 1. Finally, c
is defeated by w, simply by the preset difference score. Therefore, the Copeland
score of c is (m+ 2).
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Now, all that remains to be done is to rule z out of the running. Note that
z is defeated by w in their pairwise election: this is because z defeats w in k of
the extended votes, and is defeated by w in the remaining. This implies that its
final pairwise score with respect to w is at most t− 2k − 1 + k − (t − k) = −1.
Also note that z loses to c because of its predefined difference score. Thus, the
Copeland score of z in the extended vote is exactly (m + 1), and thus c is the
unique winner of the extended vote.
We now turn to the reverse direction. Let P ∗ be an extension of P such that
V ∗ := P ∗∪Q admits c as an unique winner with respect to the Copeland voting
rule. As with the argument for Maximin voting rule, we first argue that P ∗ must
admit a certain structure, which will lead us to an almost self-evident set cover
for U .
Let us denote by P ∗C the set of votes in P
∗ which are consistent with c ≻ d,
and let P ∗W be the set of votes in P
∗ which are consistent with w ≻ z. Note that
the votes in P ∗C necessarily have the form:
λ∗i := U \ Si ≻ z ≻ c ≻ d ≻ Si ≻ w
and those in P ∗W have the form:
λ∗i := U \ Si ≻ d ≻ Si ≻ w ≻ z ≻ c
It is easy to check that this structure is directly imposed by the relative orderings
that are fixed by the partial orders.
Before we argue the details of the scores, let us recall that in any extension
of P , z loses to c and z wins over d and all candidates in U . Thus the Copeland
score of z is at least (m+1). On the other hand, in any extension of P , c loses to
w, and therefore the Copeland score of c is at most (m+ 2). (These facts follow
from the analysis in the forward direction.)
Thus, we have the following situation. If z wins over w, then c cannot be the
unique winner in the extended vote, because the score of z goes up to (m+ 2).
Similarly, c cannot afford to lose to any of U ∪ {d}, because that will cause its
score to drop below (m + 2), resulting in either a tie with z, or worse. These
facts will successively lead us to the correctness of the reverse direction.
Now, let us return to the sets P ∗C and P
∗
W . If P
∗
C has more than k votes, then
z wins over w: the final score of z is at least t− 2k− 1+(k+1)− (t−k− 1) = 1,
and we have a contradiction. If P ∗C has fewer than k votes, then c loses to d,
with a score of at most t− 2k + 1 + (k − 1)− (t − k + 1) = −1, and we have a
contradiction.
Finally, suppose the sets corresponding to the votes of P ∗C do not form a set
cover. Consider an element ui of U not covered by the union of these sets. Observe
that c now loses the pairwise election between itself and ui and is no longer in
the running for being the unique winner in the extended vote. Therefore, the sets
corresponding to the votes of P ∗C form a set cover of size exactly k, as desired. ⊓⊔
15
3. HARDNESS OF KERNELIZATION FOR POSSIBLE WINNER
PROBLEM
3.4 Bucklin Voting Rule
We now describe the reduction for Possible Winner parameterized by the
number of candidates, for the Bucklin voting rule.
Theorem 5. The Possible Winner problem for the Bucklin voting rule, when
parameterized by the number of candidates, does not admit a polynomial kernel
unless CoNP ⊆ NP/Poly.
Proof. Let (U ,F , k) be an instance of Small Universe Set Cover, where
U = {u1, . . . , um}, and F = {S1, . . . , St}. Without loss of generality, we assume
that t > k + 1, and that every set has at least two elements. We now construct
an instance (C, V, c) of Possible Winner as follows.
Candidates. C := U ⊎ {z, c, a} ⊎W ⊎D1 ⊎D2 ⊎D3, where D1, D2, and D3 are
any sets such that |D1| = m, |D2| = 2m, and |D3| =. W := {w1, w2, . . . , w2m}.
Partial Votes, P . The first part of the voting profile comprises of t partial votes,
and will be denoted by P . For each 1 ≤ i ≤ t, we first consider a profile built on
a total order:
ηi := U \ Si ≻ Si ≻ wi%m ≻ w(i+1)%m ≻ z ≻ c ≻ D3 ≻ . . .
Now, we obtain a partial order λi based on ηi as follows:
λi := ηi \
((
{wi%m, w(i+1)%m, z, c} ⊎D3
)
× Si
)
The profile P consists of {λi | 1 ≤ i ≤ t}.
Complete Votes, Q.
t− k − 1 : D1 ≻ z ≻ c ≻ . . .
1 : D1 ≻ c ≻ a ≻ z ≻ . . .
k − 1 : D2 ≻ . . .
We now show that (U ,F , k) is an yes instance if and only if (C, V, c) is an yes
instance. Suppose, {Sj : j ∈ J} forms a set cover. Then, consider the following
extension of P :
(U \ Sj) ≻ wj%m ≻ w(j+1)%m ≻ z ≻ c ≻ D3 ≻ Sj . . . , for j ∈ J
(U \ Sj) ≻ Sj ≻ wj%m ≻ w(j+1)%m ≻ z ≻ c ≻ D3 ≻ . . . , for j /∈ J
We claim that in this extension, c is the unique winner with Bucklin score
(m+2). First, let us establish the score of c. The candidate c is already within the
top (m+1) choices in (t−k) of the complete votes. In all the sets that form the set
cover, c is ranked within the first (m+2) votes in the proposed extension of the
corresponding vote (recall that every set has at least two elements). Therefore,
there are a total of t votes where c is ranked within the top (m+2) preferences.
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Further, consider a candidate v ∈ U . Such a candidate is not within the top
(m + 2) choices of any of the complete votes. Let Si be the set that covers the
element v. Note that in the extension of the vote λi, v is not ranked among the
top (m+ 2) spots, since there are at least m candidates from D3 getting in the
way. Therefore, v has strictly fewer than t votes where it is ranked among the
top (m+ 2) spots, and thus has a higher Bucklin score than c.
Now, the candidate z is within the top (m+ 2) ranks of at most (t− k − 1)
voters among the complete votes. In the votes corresponding to the sets not in
the set cover, z is placed beyond the first (m+ 2) spots. Therefore, the number
of votes where z is among the top (m + 2) candidates is at most (t − 1), which
makes its Bucklin score strictly larger than (m+ 2).
The candidates fromW are within the top (m+2) positions only in a constant
number of votes. The candidates D1∪{a} have (t−k) votes (among the complete
ones) in which they are ranked among the top (m + 2) preferences, but in all
extensions, these candidates have ranks below (m + 2). Finally, the candidates
in D3 do not feature in the top (m+ 2) positions of any of the complete votes,
and similarly, the candidates in D2 do not feature in the top (m+2) positions of
any of the extended votes. Therefore, the Bucklin scores of all these candidates
is easily seen to be strictly larger than (m+ 2), concluding the argument in the
forward direction.
Now, consider the reverse direction. Suppose, (C, V, c) is an yes instance.
For the same reasons described in the forward direction, observe that only the
following candidates can win depending upon how the partial preferences get
extended - either one of the candidates in U , or one of z or c. Note that the
Bucklin score of z in any extension is at most (m + 3). Therefore, the Bucklin
score of c has to be (m + 2) or less. Among the complete votes Q, there are
(t− k) votes where the candidate c appears in the top (m+2) positions. To get
majority within top (m+ 2) positions, c should be within top (m+ 2) positions
for at least k of the extended votes in P . Let us call these set of votes P ′. Now
notice that whenever c comes within top (m + 2) positions in a valid extension
of P , the candidate z also comes within top (m+ 2) positions in the same vote.
However, the candidate z is already ranked among the top (m+2) candidates in
(t− k− 1) complete votes. Therefore, z can appear within top (m+2) positions
in at most k extensions (since c is the unique winner), implying that |P ′| = k.
Further, note that the Bucklin score of c cannot be strictly smaller than (m+2)
in any extension. Indeed, the candidate c features in only one of the complete
votes within the top (m + 1) positions, and it would have to be within the top
(m + 1) positions in at least (t − 1) extensions. However, as discussed earlier,
this would give z exactly the same mileage, and therefore its score Bucklin score
would be (m− 1) or even less; contradicting our assumption that c is the unique
winner.
Now, we claim that the Si’s corresponding to the votes in P
′ form a set cover
for U . If not,l there is an element x ∈ U that is uncovered. Observe that x appears
within top m positions in all the extensions of the votes in P ′, by assumption.
Further, in all the remaining extensions, since z is not present among the top
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(m+2) positions, we only have room for two candidates fromW . The remaining
positions must be filled by all the candidates corresponding to elements of U .
Therefore, x appears within the top (m+2) positions of all the extended votes.
Since these constitute half the total number of votes, we have that x ties with c
in this situation, a contradiction. ⊓⊔
3.5 Ranked Pairs Voting Rule
We now describe the reduction for Possible Winner parameterized by the
number of candidates, for the ranked pairs voting rule.
Theorem 6. The Possible Winner problem for the ranked pairs voting rule,
when parameterized by the number of candidates, does not admit a polynomial
kernel unless CoNP ⊆ NP/Poly.
Proof. Let (U ,F , k) be an instance of Small Universe Set Cover, where
U = {u1, . . . , um}, and F = {S1, . . . , St}. Without loss of generality, we assume
that t is even. We now construct an instance (C, V, c) of Possible Winner as
follows.
Candidates. C := U ⊎ {a, b, c, w}.
Partial Votes, P . The first part of the voting profile comprises of t partial votes,
and will be denoted by P . For each 1 ≤ i ≤ t, we first consider a profile built on
a total order:
ηi := U \ Si ≻ Si ≻ b ≻ a ≻ c ≻ . . .
Now, we obtain a partial order λi based on ηi as follows:
λi := ηi \ ({a, c} × (Si ⊎ {b}))
The profile P consists of {λi | 1 ≤ i ≤ t}.
Complete Votes, Q. We add complete votes such that along with the already
determined pairs from the partial votes P , we have following.
– D(vi, c) = 2, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ t
– D(c, b) = 4t
– D(c, w) = t+ 2
– D(b, a) = 2k + 4
– D(w, a) = 4t
– D(a, c) = t+ 2, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ m
– D(w, vi) = 4t
We now show that (U ,F , k) is an yes instance if and only if (C, V, c) is an yes
instance. Suppose, {Sj : j ∈ J} forms a set cover. Then, consider the following
extension of P :
U \ Sj ≻ a ≻ c ≻ Sj ≻ b ≻ . . . , ∀j ∈ J
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U \ Sj ≻ Sj ≻ b ≻ a ≻ c ≻ . . . , ∀j /∈ J
We claim that the candidate c is the unique winner in this extension. Note that
the pairs (w ≻ a) and (w ≻ vi) (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t) get locked first (since these
differences are clearly the highest and unchanged). The pair (c, b) gets locked
next, with a difference score of (3t + 2k). Now, since the votes in which c ≻ b
are based on a set cover of size at most k, the the pairwise difference between b
and a becomes at least 2k + 4− k + (t− k) = t+ 4. Therefore, the next pair to
get locked is b ≻ a. Finally, for any element vi ∈ U , the difference D(vi, c) is at
most 2 + (t− 1) = t+1, since there is at least one vote where c ≻ vi (given that
we used a set cover in the extension). It is now easy to see that the next highest
pairwise difference is between c and w, so the ordering c ≻ w gets locked, and at
this point, by transitivity, c is superior to w, b, a and all vi. It follows that c wins
the election irrespective the sequence in which pairs are considered subsequently.
Now suppose, (C, V, c) is an yes instance. Notice that, irrespective of the
extension of the votes in P , c ≻ b, w ≻ a, w ≻ vi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ t, are locked
first. Now, if b ≻ c in all the extended votes, then it is easy to check that
b ≻ a gets locked next, with a difference score of 2k + 4 + t; leaving us with
D(vi, c) = t + 2 = D(c, w), where vi ≻ c could be a potential lock-in. This
implies the possibility of a vi being a winner in some choice of tie-breaking, a
contradiction to the assumption that c is the unique winner. Therefore, there
are at least some votes in the extended profile where c ≻ b. We now claim
that there are at most k such votes. Indeed, if there are more, then D(b, a) =
2k+ 4− (k+1)+ (t− k− 1) = t+2. Therefore, after the forced lock-ins above,
we have D(b, a) = D(c, w) = D(a, c) = t+2. Here, again, it is possible for a ≻ c
to be locked in before the other choices, and we again have a contradiction.
Finally, we have that c ≻ b in at most k many extensions in P . Call the set
of indices of these extensions J . We claim that {Sj : j ∈ J} forms a set cover.
If not, then suppose an element vi is not covered by {Sj : j ∈ J}. Then, the
candidate vi comes before c in all the extensions which makes D(vi, c) become
(t+2), which in turn ties with D(c, w). This again contradicts the fact that c is
the unique winner. Therefore, if there is an extension that makes c the unique
winner, then we have the desired set cover. ⊓⊔
4 Polynomial Kernels for Coalitional Manipulation
Problem
We now describe a kernelization algorithm for any scoring rule which has the
following properties. For m ∈ N, let (α1, . . . , αm) and (α′1, . . . , α
′
m+1) be the
normalized score vectors for a scoring rule for an election with m and (m + 1)
candidates respectively. Then α1 = O(poly(m)) and αi = α
′
i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
For ease of exposition, we present the result for the Borda voting rule only.
Theorem 7. The Coalitional Manipulation problem for the Borda voting
rule admits a polynomial kernel when the number of manipulators is O(poly(m)).
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Proof. Let c be the candidate whom the manipulators aim to make winner. Let
M be the set of manipulators and C candidate set. Let sNM (x) be the score of
candidate x from the votes of the non-manipulators. Without loss of generality,
we assume that, all the manipulators place c at top position in their votes. Hence,
the final score of c is = sNM (c) + |M |(m− 1), which we denote by s(c). Now, if
sNM (x) ≥ s(c) for any x 6= c, then c cannot win and we output no. Hence, we
assume that sNM (x) < s(c) for all x 6= c. Now let us define s∗NM (x) as follows.
s∗NM (x) := max{sNM (x), sNM (c)}
Also define s∗NM (c) as follows.
s∗NM (c) := sNM (c)− |M |
We define a Coalitional Manipulation instance with (m+ 1) candidates as
(C′, NM,M, c), where C′ = C ⊎ {d} is the candidate set, M is the set of ma-
nipulators, c is the distinguished candidates, and NM is the non-manipulators’
vote is such that it generates score of x ∈ C to be K + (s∗NM (x) − sNM (c)),
where K ∈ N is same for x ∈ C, and the score of d is less than K −m|M |. The
existence of such a NM of size poly(m) is due to Lemma 1. Hence, once we show
the equivalence of these two instances, we have a kernel whose size is polynomial
in m. The equivalence of the two instances follows from the facts that (1) the
new instance has (m+ 1) candidates and c is always placed at the top position
without loss of generality, c gets |M | score more than the initial instance and this
is compensated in s∗NM (c), (2) the relative score difference from the final score of
c to the current score of every x ∈ C \ {c} is same in both the instances, and (3)
in the new instance, we can assume without loss of generality that the candidate
d will be placed in the second position in all the manipulators’ votes. ⊓⊔
We now move on to the voting rules that are based on weighted majority
graph. The reduction rules modify the weighted majority graph maintaining the
property that there exists a set of votes that can realize the modified weighted
majority graph. In particular, the final weighted majority graph is realizable
with a set of votes.
Theorem 8. The Coalitional Manipulation problem for the maximin vot-
ing rule admits a polynomial kernel when the number of manipulators is
O(poly(m)).
Proof. Let c be the distinguished candidate of the manipulators. Let M be the
set of manipulators. We can assume that |M | ≥ 2 since for |M | = 1, the problem
is in P [Bartholdi et al., 1989]. Define s to be minx∈C\{c}D(V\M)(c, x). So, s is
the maximin score of the candidate c from the votes except from M . Since, the
maximin voting rule is monotone, we can assume that the voters in M put the
candidate c at top position of their preferences. Hence, c’s final maximin score
will be s+ |M |. This provides the following reduction rule.
Reduction rule 1 If s+ |M | ≥ 0, then output Yes.
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In the following, we will assume s + |M | is negative. Now we propose the
following reduction rules on the weighted majority graph.
Reduction rule 2 If D(V\M)(ci, cj) < 0 and D(V\M)(ci, cj) > 2|M | + s, then
make D(V\M)(ci, cj) either 2|M | + s + 1 or 2|M | + s + 2 whichever keeps the
parity of D(V\M)(ci, cj) unchanged.
If D(V\M)(ci, cj) > 2|M | + s,,then DV(ci, cj) > |M | + s irrespective of the
way the manipulators vote. Hence, whether or not the maximin score of ci and
cj will exceed the maximin score of c does not gets affected by this reduction
rule. Hence, reduction rule 1 is sound.
Reduction rule 3 If D(V\M)(ci, cj) < s, then make D(V\M)(ci, cj) either s− 1
or s− 2 whichever keeps the parity of D(V\M)(ci, cj) unchanged.
The argument for the correctness of reduction rule 3 is similar to the ar-
gument for reduction rule 1. Here onward, we may assume that whenever
D(V\M)(ci, cj) < 0, s− 2 ≤ D(V\M)(ci, cj) ≤ 2|M |+ s+ 2
Reduction rule 4 If s < −4|M | then subtract s + 5|M | whenever s − 2 ≤
D(V\M)(ci, cj) ≤ 2|M |+ s+ 2.
The correctness of reduction rule 4 follows from the fact that it adds linear
fixed offsets to all the edges of the weighted majority graph. Hence, if there a
voting profile of the voters in M that makes the candidate c win in the original
instance, the same voting profile will make c win the election in the reduced
instance and vice versa.
Now, we have an weighted majority graph with O(|M |) weights for every
edge. Also, all the weights have uniform parity and thus the result follows from
lemma 2. ⊓⊔
The proof of the following theorem is analogous to the proof of Theorem 8.
In the interest of space, we omit the proof.
Theorem 9. The Coalitional Manipulation problem for the Copeland
voting rule admits a polynomial kernel when the number of manipulators is
O(poly(m)).
Proof. We apply the following reduction rule.
Reduction rule 1 If D(V\M)(ci, cj) > |M |, then make D(V\M)(ci, cj) either
|M |+ 1 or |M |+ 2 whichever keeps the parity of D(V\M)(ci, cj) unchanged.
Given any votes of M , DV(ci, cj) > 0 in the original instance if and only if
DV(ci, cj) > 0 in the reduced instance. Hence each candidate has the same
Copeland score and thus the reduction rule is correct.
Now, we have an weighted majority graph with O(|M |) weights for every
edges. Also, all the weights have uniform parity. From lemma 2, we can realize
the weighted majority graph using O(m2.|M |) votes. ⊓⊔
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Theorem 10. The Coalitional Manipulation problem for the ranked pairs
voting rule admits a polynomial kernel when the number of manipulators is
O(poly(m)).
Proof. Consider all non-negative D(V\M)(ci, cj) and arrange them in non-
decreasing order. Let the ordering be x1, x2, . . . , xl where l =
(
m
2
)
. Now keep
applying following reduction rule till possible. Define x0 = 0.
Reduction rule 1 If there exist any i such that, xi − xi−1 > |M |+ 2, subtract
an even offset to all xi, xi+1, . . . , xl such that xi becomes either (xi−1+ |M |+1)
or (xi−1 + |M |+ 2).
The reduction rule is correct since for any set of votes by M , for any four
candidates a, b, x, y ∈ C, D(a, b) > D(x, y) in the original instance if and only if
D(a, b) > D(x, y) in the reduced instance. Now, we have an weighted majority
graph with O(m2.|M |) weights for every edges. Also, all the weights have uniform
parity and hence can be realized with O(m4.|M |) votes Lemma 2. ⊓⊔
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Here, we showed that the Possible Winner problem does not admit a poly-
nomial kernel for many common voting rules under the complexity theoretic
assumption that CoNP ⊆ NP/Poly is not true. We also showed the existence
of polynomial kernels for the Coalitional Manipulation problem for many
common voting rules. This shows that the Possible Winner problem is a
significantly harder problem than the Coalitional Manipulation problem,
although both the problems are in NPC.
There are other interesting parameterizations of these problems for which
fixed parameter tractable algorithms are known but the corresponding kernel-
ization questions are still open. One such parameter is the total number of pairs
s in all the votes for which an ordering has not been specified. With this pa-
rameter, a simple O(2s. poly(m,n)) algorithm is known [Betzler et al., 2009b].
However, the corresponding kernelization question is still open.
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